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ABSTRACT
JOSHUA M. JANSA: The Strategic Use of Fear in Public Policy Debates
(Under the direction of Frank R. Baumgartner.)
While emotions are powerful determinants of political behavior, how these emo-
tions are activated by the appeals of elites is not fully understood. However, this
needs to change given the potentially large impact of emotions on policy outcomes.
This paper argues that political actors will appeal to different emotions depending
on their policy stance; defenders of the status quo appeal to fear and enthusiasm
and proponents of change appeal to hope and anger. Hope and anger lead to risk–
taking behavior that proponents of change need to harness in efforts to persuade
citizens and lawmakers to change policy. Likewise, defenders of the status quo ap-
peal to fear and enthusiasm in an effort to maximize risk–averse behavior. To test
the theory, a dictionary of fear words is applied to statements on gun–control in
an automated content analysis. Support is found for the hypothesis that defenders
of the status quo use fear at a higher rate than advocates of change. Most impor-
tantly, the study lays the groundwork for new forays into the mediating force of
emotion in relationship between political actors and the mass public in the public
policy process.
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Introduction
Emotion is on prominent display in nearly every political struggle. Just by
looking at the last few years of American politics, one can easily observe the anger
of the Tea Party, the hope inspired by Barack Obama, and the all too often devo-
lution into the politics of fear, from death panels to terrorism. These emotions are
more than just the makings of a good story; they actually have large consequences
for politics and policy making. The enthusiasm the voting public feels for Social
Security makes it the “third rail” of politics, while the uncertainty surrounding
the contents of the Affordable Care Act kept the public cold to the bill and nearly
sank its chances of passage.
Politics and emotions go hand–in–hand. Emotions help people form impres-
sions and react to the world around them, and political scientists are often inter-
ested in how people understand and react to the political system. Only recently,
however, has emotion begun to take a more central role in political science research
and only in the study of mass political behavior. Although we know that political
elites frame issues, mobilize the grassroots, and use the bully pulpit to help them
win political battles, we know much less about how emotions are strategically ap-
pealed to by political elites as a means of accomplishing their goals. Thus, we are
left with the question: How do political actors use emotional appeals to help them
affect public policy?
In particular, the emotions of fear, hope, anger, and enthusiasm are often ap-
pealed to by political actors. These emotions influence political behavior because
they affect perceptions of risk. Advocating for a change in policy is asking law-
makers to take a risk, replacing the known (even if it is broken) status quo with an
untried policy proposal. As a result, defenders of the status quo attempt to max-
imize risk–averse behavior through appeals to enthusiasm and fear. Conversely,
proponents of change attempt to maximize risk–taking behavior through appeals
to hope and anger. In a limited test of the theory, statements from interest groups
involved in the recent gun–control debate were collected and analyzed for instances
of fear appeals. These statements were coded both by hand and through an auto-
mated content analysis using a first–of–its–kind dictionary of fear words. Support
is found for the hypothesis that fear, on average, is appealed to by defenders of
the status quo.
The Effect of Emotional Appeals
In much of the political science literature, humans are assumed to be cool
calculators who can easily understand the costs and benefits of policies and the
related arguments for action. However, recent research in political science, psy-
chology, and neuroscience suggest this is not the case. In their book on affective
intelligence theory and political decision making, Marcus, Neuman, and MacK-
uen (2000) make the case that human cognition is inextricably linked to emotion.
In fact, emotional response precedes cognitive processes. According to affective
intelligence theory, humans are given a stimulus; this stimulus produces an emo-
tional reaction, which helps form a cognitive and conscious assessment of the
situation. For example, anxiety causes people to gather more information about
the situation and potentially reconsider their standing assessment, while enthusi-
asm reinforces standing assessments and provide no motivation for reconsidering
them (Marcus, Neuman, and MacKuen 2000; Just, Crigler, and Belt 2007). Thus,
unless provoked by a particular emotion, humans are creatures of habit that rely
on preconceived preferences. Cognitive appraisal theory (see Lazarus 1991, Rose-
man 1991, Roseman and Smith 2001) works in a similar manner. Humans are
presented with a stimulus; the brain subconsciously recognizes the stimulus and
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recalls the appropriate emotional response The mind then becomes consciously
aware of the stimulus via the emotional reaction. In other words, humans learn
how to emotionally react to familiar stimuli. Only truly unique stimuli create
learning situations; the human brain does not recognize the unique stimuli and
therefore has no standing decision or emotional reaction to recall. Affective intelli-
gence theory and cognitive appraisal theory are very similar. In each, humans rely
on emotions to make conscious our immediate reaction. Humans are creatures of
habit, only learning when presented with new, uncertain and unsettling stimuli.
There are a variety of emotions that people can experience, branching far be-
yond simple valence (“positive or “negative”). In fact, psychological research has
shown that the dichotomy between positive and negative emotions has proven to
not be very useful. Instead, specific, or discrete, emotions are much more im-
portant to our understanding of cognition, as they combine valence and temporal
orientation in assessment and behavior (Just, Crigler, and Belt 2007). The lit-
erature identifies four politically relevant emotions: fear, enthusiasm, hope, and
anger. Enthusiasm is a positive, zealous, and feverous feeling about what has
happened or is currently occurring. Hope, on the other hand, is a positive, ex-
cited, and optimistic feeling about what is to come. Both are positive emotions,
but enthusiasm is present–oriented and hope is future–oriented (Just, Crigler, and
Belt 2007). Likewise, fear and anger are both negative emotions, but have differ-
ent temporal orientations with fear being future–oriented and anger being present
oriented.
Each of these emotions have an effect on attitudes toward risk and thus be-
havior. Research on anger and hope find that they are both related to related
to risk–taking behavior (Huddy, Feldman, Cassese 2007); subjects exhibited a
willingness to take action with less careful consideration of alternatives and di-
minishment of perceived risks. Fear, on the other hand, is linked to risk–avoidance
behavior through heightened sensitivity and attention to threat, an overestima-
tion of risk, and careful information processing (Huddy, Feldman, and Cassese
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2007). Research on prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Quattrone
and Tversky 1988) shows that risk–assessment affects the choices people make. In
particular, people are risk–adverse when potential “gains” or “benefits” are on the
line. Fearing loss of these benefits, people become cautious. However, when people
have no benefit to lose, they are more likely to engage in risk–taking behavior.
Table 1 displays the discrete emotions, their temporal orientation, valence, and
resulting behavior.
Table 1: Emotions and Political Behavior
Future Oriented Present Oriented
Fear] Anger♦ Negative
Hope♦ Enthusiasm] Positive
] Risk–averse ♦ Risk–taking
Constructing Emotional Appeals
The most common way political actors appeal to the public and other political
actors is through the use of frames. Stone (1989) argues that framing is the process
of defining a societal condition as a public problem worthy of attention. While
there are many things in life that are problematic, that does not mean the public
views them as problems worthy of public attention and political action. When
defining problems, blame is often assigned to something for causing the problem.
This is the causal story, or frame, that is meant to change the way people think
about the problem. The way the masses and elites think about the cause of the
problem is inextricably linked to how they act to solve the problem.
Similarly, Schneider and Ingram (1993) discuss the social construction of groups
as framing. Society tends to label groups as worthy or unworthy of public bene-
fits. Government, as a result, will act in a particular way toward these different
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groups, depending on how they are framed. Taking welfare policy for example,
much of public opinion on welfare spending is based on the perception of recipients
being predominantly black (Kuklinski et al 2000; Soss and Schram 2007; Hurwitz
and Peﬄey 2005). The framing of groups is a critical component of public policy
that informs the attitudes people hold towards those groups and overwhelms the
objective facts on welfare spending.
Other authors have taken a different approach to framing, including Jones
(1994) who argues that framing is simply highlighting certain dimensions of an
issue. The issue of the superconducting supercollider is a good example of this
type of framing. The supercollider was first seen as a boon to jobs and scientific
discovery, but then viewed as a boondoggle in an increasingly weakening economy
and ballooning deficit. Funding for the superconducting supercollider was termi-
nated following the shift in attention from jobs to the deficit.
The common component to each definition of framing is that frames a) de-
fine something, whether it is defining the key dimension of focus, the person of
blame, or the mission of a social movement and b) are inextricably linked to policy
outcomes. Benford and Snow (2000) sum this up nicely, identifying framing as
explaining whether we need to act, how we need to act, and why we should act.
Included in frames are emotional appeals, or information meant to elicit affec-
tive reactions in order to persuade a person into supporting a particular action
on an issue. Political actors appeal to emotions for the same reasons they frame
issues: to convince the public and policy makers to act in a particular manner.
The concept of emotional appeals is not new. Aristotle famously identified the
three components of an argument as logos, pathos, and ethos. Logos is the logic
of the argument, the most substantive part of the argument that offers evidence
and data to support an argument. Pathos, however, is the emotional content of
the argument. Pathos provides examples, images, and reasoning meant to evoke
an emotional response in the audience. Ethos is about establishing the credibility
of the speaker so that an argument carries extra heft. Examples can easily be
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drawn for each of these components just by looking at current events—logos is
represented every day in newspaper articles covering the benefits and drawbacks
of different policies, pathos is represented in impassioned speeches, and these ar-
guments are carried by experts and policy insiders who use their reputations to
support their arguments.
Common among these three components are the use of rhetorical fallacies.
Rhetorical fallacies are devices commonly used in argumentation although they
represent “errors in reasoning” (Walton 2008). Pathos, in particular, has many
rhetorical fallacies associated with it, including directly appealing to emotions. A
non-fallacious emotional argument provides illustrative examples of the logic of
the argument that are likely to draw endearment from the audience. Nonetheless,
fallacies can serve the rhetoricians’ intentions of convincing the audience. For ex-
ample, framing the Affordable Care Act as a government takeover of health care
was not simply a strategy to make people think about the logic behind greater
government intervention. Instead, it also cued emotional responses such as fear
of what government involvement might entail (such as death panels) and the im-
plementation of a so–called “socialist agenda.” While these are the rhetorical
fallacies of exaggeration of threat and ad hominen, they nonetheless served as an
effective strategy to tamping down support for President’s Obama’s key piece of
domestic legislation.
Why Elites Make Emotional Appeals
Emotions are appealed to by elites in an effort to achieve political and policy
goals. David Easton, a pioneer in the study of public policy, observed that public
policy is the authoritative allocation of values on society (1965). Different actors,
whether they be political parties, social movements, interest groups, or individual
office holders vie for influence over the public policy process. Conflict is inherent
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in the formulation and adoption of policy, as the values of one group can come
into conflict with the values of another. Political actors coalesce around these val-
ues, advocating for why their preferred public policy would be beneficial. Even if
purely motivated by reelection, elected officials will engage in some level of policy
debate. Richard Fenno (1973), in his discussion of the goals of congressmen, points
out that the achievement of any of his three goals (re-election, public policy, and
influence) is dependent on excelling in the other two.
Some work has been done on emotional appeals and its ability to motivate po-
litical behavior. Thomas Frank (2004) examines the use of anger as a strategy that
perpetually motivates support for the conservative movement. Prominent conser-
vatives, according to Frank, are constantly prompted to feel angry, motivating a
high degree of engagement and mobilization. Many scholars have discussed the
use of fear in political rhetoric as a major contributor to the growing “culture of
fear” (Furedi 2006; Glassner 1999; Robin 2004). The culture of fear is the society–
wide fixation on risk and desire to reduce undesirable outcomes even if it means
sacrificing other democratic values. According to this thesis, elites are active in
shaping the culture of fear, using it to derail undesirable policies and instead gar-
ner support for their own, desirable policy proposals (Glassner 1999). The culture
of fear is prominently featured in Michael Moore’s famous documentary Bowling
for Columbine (2003), in which he uses the fear of racial minorities as an expla-
nation for the rise in gun ownership in the United States. Fear is often cited, as
Moore does, for inciting overreactions in society. Furedi (2006) explains that is
because people routinely fail to grasp the true risk involved in certain actions. In
other words, people are terribly inept at grasping how risky things actually are,
systematically overreacting to scary things and under–reacting to things that are
just as detrimental but not as scary.1
Though studies have often focused on the strategy and consequences of negative
1 This is supported by empirical research by Slovic (1987), who found that humans tend to
judge risk based on whether a situation is controllable, dreadful, or unfamiliar. We do not fear
the things we can control, that are not dreadful, and that are familiar–even if they are more
likely to kill us.
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advertising (e.g., Ansolabehere and Iyengar 1997), others have looked at discrete
emotional appeals. Roseman, Abelson, and Ewing (1986) find that various dis-
crete emotions are appealed to in print advertising, while Brader (2005) finds that
candidates use audio and visual appeals to emotions in their television advertis-
ing. De Castella et al (2009; 2011) find that western leaders routinely appealed to
fear and anger in their speeches on terrorism, and at politically opportune times.
From the literature, we can gather that emotions 1) have consequences for public
opinion and political behavior and 2) are routinely appealed to by political elites.
In particular, emotions can affect the assessment of risk and thus the perception
of the political world. What is left unknown is whether all emotions appealed
haphazardly, or are there differences in emotional appeals based on the goals the
political actor is trying to accomplish?
A Theoretical Framework of Emotional Appeals
Because emotions have a profound impact on political behavior, political actors
will attempt to appeal to emotions. Appealing to emotions in the electorate is a
means of achieving political goals. Because emotions have particular behavioral
effects, political actors appeal to the emotions that correspond with the behavior
they wish to activate. That is, the appropriate strategy for defenders of the status
quo is to appeal to fear and enthusiasm in an attempt to dissuade risk–taking
in the form of adopting a new policy. On the other hand, proponents of change
appeal to hope and anger in order to convince people to go with an unknown
policy over the known status quo. This basic strategy applies across spectrum of
ideology and issues.
Policy conflict often spills out of the halls of government and into the wider
public. This is often deliberate, what Schattschneider (1960) calls a conflict ex-
pansion. When losing on a given public policy fight, actors appeal to the public
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to turn the tide. Often, this involves trying to convince the public that the status
quo is either problematic or worthy of keeping in place. Generally, the losing side
tends to want to expand the scope of conflict; there is little incentive to tinker with
a winning strategy. However, emotions are still appealed to by both sides because
it is an effective and essential rhetorical strategy that can affect both the masses
and elites. That is, emotions can move people to become involved in politics by
motivating them to contact their legislator, donate to causes, and spread the word
among their acquaintances. Emotions can also move elites. Emotional reactions
to news, witness testimony, or even the knowledge of emotional reactions in the
electorate can prompt legislators to behave in a particular manner.
Political actors strategically attempt to motivate different political behaviors
through the use of emotional appeals. Emotional appeals change a person’s frame
of reference by affecting perceptions of risk and therefore political preferences. In
politics, conservatives feel anger toward the Affordable Care Act, while liberals
feel anger toward the Iraq War. Conversely, conservatives may feel enthusiasm
toward the Iraq War, while liberals are enthusiastic about the Affordable Care
Act. Anger is associated with negatively appraised policy and motivates political
mobilization against that policy. When feeling anger toward a policy, an individ-
ual finds themselves in the domain of losses. The existing policy, whether it is
sustaining high troop levels in Iraq for liberals or implementing parts of the new
health care law for conservatives, represents the status quo for that policy area.
Because the status quo is incongruent with their policy preferences, this is a “loss”
or “lack of benefit” as the status quo is providing no or negative utility. Since
there is no benefit to the status quo, risks can be taken in order to change the
status quo. These risks may include motivating participation in get–out–the–vote
drives or in donating to a political party or interest group. Feeling enthusiastic,
on the other hand, is linked to the appraisal of “gains” or “benefits” in the status
quo. To protect these gains, risk must be minimized and, therefore, people who
feel enthusiastic about a policy will be averse to changes in it. This is where elites
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step in. While ideologues likely have strong emotional appraisals of policies, many
people fall in the middle of the road without strong feelings on policies. Elites can
make emotional appeals in order to send information on how people should feel
about the status quo.
The type of emotion political actors appeal to depends on what side of the
debate they find themselves on. A policy debate generally breaks into two sides:
defenders of the status quo and proponents of change. Proponents of change pro-
pose that the status quo is unsustainable and thus must be changed, forwarding
a proposal to do so. The goal of defenders of the status quo is to prevent the
proposed change from becoming policy. This may be because the defenders were
invested in the formulation of the status quo policy and are now invested in its
continued existence, or that they simply view the change proposed as the wrong
fix to the broken status quo. The status quo may reflect their values, values that
the proponents of change oppose. The status quo may also represent an economic,
social, or political benefit for certain interests, making it a policy that will be
defended vigorously. Whatever the case, defenders of the status quo view the
direction of change as detrimental to their concept of good public policy.
Defenders of the status quo, convinced that the policy change should not be
adopted, work to convince the public, media, and lawmakers that preserving the
status quo will yield a greater benefit than changing it. In other words, they want
people to view the status quo as a beneficial gain rather than a detrimental loss.
This can be done by extolling the virtues of the status quo, framing the policy in
a positive light. It can also be done by making the proposed change look risky,
half–baked, dangerous, and all together bad. Attacking the other sides’ plans,
motivations, and the possible consequences (however unlikely they may be) can
elicit the emotions necessary to give the message strength and win the policy
battle.
Fear and enthusiasm motivate risk–averse behavior, one by creating good feel-
ings toward the present and the other by creating aversion to possible changes.
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Thus, defenders of the status quo use frames that promote the uncertainty of the
effectiveness of proposed changes, highlight the what–ifs and slippery–slope nature
of change, while also explaining how the status quo reflects revered values and
creates positive benefits beyond what it might seem when taken on face value.
These emotions can be elicited through code–words, rhetorical fallacies, and even
images and sounds.
Appeals to fear have several effects that make them particularly attractive
to status quo defenders. First, it motivates people to gather more information
about the issue, slowing down the charge toward change in hopes that stalling it
will kill it. Second, it primes people to feel threatened by the change in hopes
of convincing people to support the status quo and thus defeat change. Enthusi-
asm is also attractive to status quo defenders because it discourages information
gathering about the status quo. In this way, feeling enthusiastic about the status
quo discourages criticism and reconsideration of the status quo. A fear and en-
thusiasm appeal will shift focus from the supposedly broken status quo, instead
shining a bright spotlight on the proposed change and what it might do. The
increased scrutiny and slowing of the policy process on its own could be enough
to kill change.
Turning to the other side of the debate, hope and anger are appealed to by
proponents of change in order to motivate risk–taking behavior. These appeals
will attempt to create a revulsion to the status quo, highlighting its detriments,
costs, and general unsustainability while also increasing feelings of efficacy, that
change can happen and should happen. These emotions, like fear and enthusiasm,
can be elicited through code–words, rhetorical fallacies, images, and sounds.
Appeals to hope have several effects that make it particularly attractive to
proponents of change. First, it motivates people to see the political process in
an efficacious way, prompting mobilization of opinion and resources in favor of
change. Second, it discourages information gathering, instead speeding up the
push for change and sweeping aside delay. Anger is also attractive to proponents
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of change because it encourages information gathering about the status quo. In
this way, feeling angry about the status quo encourages criticism and reconsidera-
tion of the status quo. A hope and anger appeal will keep the nitty gritty details
of change in the dark and instead shine the light on the status quo, its detriments
and need for change. This leads to the formal hypothesis listed below.
Fear Hypothesis: Defenders of the status quo, all else equal, appeal to fear at
a greater rate than proponents of change.
Enthusiasm Hypothesis: Defenders of the status quo, all else equal, appeal to
enthusiasm at a greater rater than proponents of change.
Hope Hypothesis: Proponents of change, all else equal, appeal to hope at a greater
rate than defenders of the status quo.
Anger Hypothesis: Proponents of change, all else equal, appeal to anger at a
greater rate than defenders of the status quo.
Measuring Emotional Appeals
While we can grasp emotion and its power because of familiarity through ex-
perience, defining it in a manner that makes measurement possible is much more
difficult. Few studies have tried to measure emotional appeals by political elites,
and none have measured them in a manner that employs automated content anal-
ysis.2 To develop measurements of emotional appeals, this paper focuses on a
single emotion: fear. Fear is perhaps the most well researched of the politically–
2 De Castella et al (2009, 2011) employ a hand coding scheme of speeches on terrorism based
on cognitive appraisal theory and Brader (2005) codes advertisements based on their sounds and
images, but not the words of the advertisement.
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relevant emotions, with the literature providing descriptions of its components
when used in rhetoric, as well as a vibrant debate over its use by political elites.
In particular, the literature on fear tends to focus on two dimensions: threat
and uncertainty.3 That is, words and phrases that elicit fear are those that em-
phasize the threat a situation poses and an unceratinty or inability to control
the consequences of that threat. Rather than providing an efficacious frame in
which a threat exists but something can and should be done about it, fear instead
is highlighted by a lack of control over the situation.4 Eliciting fear is about
demonstrating a threat (threat words), but also a susceptibility to that threat
(uncertainty words).
The next challenge comes from actually extracting the emotion meant to be
elicited by political speech. New developments in a) the automated coding of large
amounts of text and b) the measurement of emotional sentiment in text makes it
possible to build a dictionary of threat and uncertainty words that can be used as
a measure of the use of fear in political speech. Laver, Benoit, and Garry (2003)
developed software to extract policy positions from party platforms by analyzing
the frequency of certain words in a document rather than human reading and
interpretation. An automated approach allows the researcher to develop a dictio-
nary of words to serve as the measure of the concept forwarded in their theory,
apply that dictionary to a corpus of documents, and get a frequency of dictionary
words for each document in the corpus. This approach can be adapted for this
paper by providing a theoretically based dictionary of fear and applying it to a
corpus of political speech. Work has also been done on computer measurement of
the emotional sentiment of a piece of writing, used mostly in psychological and
rhetorical research to capture the emotions expressed by the author (Pennebaker,
Francis, and Booth 2001; Strappavara and Valitutti 2004).
Dictionaries of emotion exist, but are tailored for measuring the underlying
3 See De Castella et al 2009 for an outline, which borrows predominately from the cognitive
appraisal literature on eliciting emotions.
4 This also comports with Slovic’s (1987) findings on what people fear.
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emotional state of a patient or writer, not for attempts to elicit emotion. The con-
cept this paper is attempting the capture is the strategic use of fear, while existing
sentiment dictionaries capture the feeling of fear. This was a severe limitation of
the dictionaries that required the inclusion of other words that are much more
commonly used in political speech. Though many words can be borrowed from
these dictionaries for a dictionary on the use of fear, other words that are more
commonly used in political rhetoric also needed to be incorporated to correctly
capture the concept being tested. To begin, words pertaining to fear in existing
sentiment analysis dictionaries5 were gathered and separated into either a threat
word or an uncertainty word. Threat words are words that describe the danger
or risk of a situation. For example, threat words include scheme, strip, trample,
endanger and destroy. Uncertainty words are words that describe the unknowable
or uncontrollable nature of a situation. Examples of uncertainty words include
might, could, secrecy and distrust. Next, several different types of political speech
were gathered and analyzed for additional threat and uncertainty words. These
types of speech include speeches from presidential candidates during the 2008
campaign, floor speeches by members of Congress during the debate to raise the
debt ceiling, and conservative and liberal blogs on the health care reform debate.
Words that were used to discuss the threat a policy or politician posed to the
audience and appeared across each of the three different types of political speech
were included as threat words in the fear dictionary. A similar method was used
to compile words that convey uncertainty into the fear dictionary. Again, looking
across multiple types of political speech, words that were often used and in a
manner that discussed the unknowns associated with a policy or politician were
included in the dictionary. Words that were gathered from the sentiment dictio-
naries that did not appear across the three types of speech were dropped from
the dictionary, as there was little evidence of their use in actually political speech
5 These dictionaries include the Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count dictionary by Pennebaker
et al (2001), Regressive Imagery Dictionary by Martindale (1975), and WordNet Affect by Strap-
pavarra and Valitutti (2004)
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(and therefore not commonly used to elicit fear). The entire dictionary can be
found in the appendix of this article.
Data: The 2012–13 Gun Control Debate
To test the hypothesis that defenders of the status quo, all else equal, will use
fear at a higher rate during public policy debates, data was gathered in the form
of press releases from gun–related interest groups. The statements are taken from
seven different groups, four of which are gun–control advocates (Brady Campaign
to End Gun Violence, Campaign to Stop Gun Violence, Mayors Against Illegal
Guns, and Violence Policy Center) and three of which are gun–rights groups (Gun
Owners of America, National Rifle Association, and Citizens Committee for the
Right to Keep and Bear Arms). Each press release was generally on one sub–issue
related to gun control and press releases that did not involve a policy discussion,
for example those that discussed election results or community events put on by
the group, were not collected. 116 press releases come from the gun–control groups
and 170 press releases come from gun–rights groups, for a total of 286 press releases.
Coding and Verifying the Dependent Variable
The press releases range in date from May 2012 to February 2013.6 To con-
struct the dependent variable (the use of fear), each press release was coded for
how many fear words appear in their text. The free content analysis program
Yoshikoder was used to apply the fear dictionary to each of the press releases.
6 During this time frame, the salience of the gun control debate ranged from very low salience
to very high salience following the tragedy at Sandy Hook Elementary in late December 2012.
My theory does not presuppose a dynamic relationship between salience and use of fear, so it
is not explored in depth here. However, some preliminary analysis including an error correction
model with salience as an independent variable showed no reason to believe there was a dynamic
process in determining the use of fear in political rhetoric.
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Yoshikoder produces a count of words and their concordances (the five words be-
fore and after the dictionary hit). False hits were eliminated from the count of
fear words by examining the concordances.7 A summary of the results of coding
the dependent variable are presented in Table 2.
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics: Dependent Variable
Total Min Mean Max Std. Dev.
Threat Words 593 0 2.07 12 2.20
Uncertainty Words 321 0 1.12 11 1.55
Fear Words 914 0 3.21 23 3.12
All Words 146393 64 51.86 3177 325.80
The dictionary of fear words is meant to extract the emotional appeal being
made in a theoretically sound but efficient manner. Past studies have hand–coded
speech to identify emotional appeals. Most notably, De Castella et al (2009, 2011)
use a coding scheme in which they look for relevancy, threat, and uncertainty
statements as evidence of appeals to fear in speeches by western democratic lead-
ers during the height of the War on Terror. This represents a more traditional
way of coding text and a method that can be used to verify the validity of the
dictionary of fear words. To do this, a subset of 84 press releases were hand–coded
for the use of fear. This was done for two reasons: the first being to provide
qualitative evidence of what the use of fear looks like, and the second being to val-
idate the fear dictionary’s ability to capture the concept of the use of fear. When
hand–coding, I looked for five different types of rhetorical devices that could be
used to elicit fear: slippery slope arguments, highlighting unknown or unintended
consequences, hyperbole in relation to threat, insinuation of ulterior motives, and
7 For example, question is a word included in the uncertainty portion of the dictionary. Ques-
tion was used in rhetoric such as when the press release questions the consequences and motives
of a particular policy. Sometimes, question was used in a simple, descriptive contexts such as
“Attorney General Eric Holder was on the hill to answer questions today.” These false hits were
eliminated.
16
explaining the uncontrollable nature of the situation.8 The former three center
on the discussion of the policy itself, while the latter two focus on the efforts of the
opposite side of the debate. There is also considerable overlap in that each tends
to tap into both the threat and uncertainty aspects of fear. See the appendix for
full operationalization of these rhetorical strategies.
So what does the use of fear look like? Often times, one side of the debate
attempted to paint the other side as holding ulterior motives. For example, the
Citizens Committee for the Right to Keep and Bear Arms (CCRKBA) stated
that “Pat Quinn wants to take away the freedom of Illinois citizens because some
psycho misused a gun in Colorado...He’s just exploiting that case to please his
anti–gun supporters.” Rather than attack Quinn on the facts of the issue, or even
on his stated motivations for pursuing gun control measures, the CCRKBA instead
attempts to make Quinn out to be the puppet of anti–gun activists. The attack
on Quinn is meant to raise feelings of fear through uncertainty over the motives
of the governor. Other common examples of fear in context include the hyperbole
in relation to threat, such as the Brady Campaign’s statement “Quite simply,
Rand Paul is promoting the gun lobby’s agenda and if he and the gun lobby have
their way, innocent people will die.” This type of rhetoric is meant to enhance
the threat that average citizens (in this case, the citizens of Washington, D.C.)
feel from efforts to legislate the wider availability of guns. Yet another example
is that of slippery slope arguments, such as the Gun Owners of America’s (GOA)
statement that “This treaty would pave the way for an anti–gun Obama Adminis-
tration to unlawfully impose registration restrictions...This is a huge problem, as
gun registration has historically been a first step towards gun confiscation.” Here,
the GOA wants to highlight the fact that support for the U.N. Arms Trade Treaty
is actually a step toward total gun confiscation. Therefore, the treaty should not
be viewed as a disagreeable policy, but a major threat to the value system of
Americans.
8 Some guidance for these was taken from Sobieraj and Berry’s (2011) work on incivility and
outrage in talk radio.
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Each of the press releases in the subset were coded for these rhetorical devices
and then compared to the automated count of fear words generated by applying
the fear dictionary to the press releases. The correlation between the number of
fear instances and the number of fear words was calculated using Pearson’s corre-
lation coefficient. A line graph depicting the results is provided in Figure 1. Here,
the hand–coding of fear tracks closely with the automated measure of fear words,
resulting in a Pearson’s r correlation of .724. The relatively high correlation is
good evidence for the soundness of the fear dictionary in actually measuring fear
in political speech. The correlation suffers from the fact that it is comparing the
same concept, but two different things. That is, hand–coding of fear picked up
mostly individual sentences that conveyed fear while the dictionary is word based;
Multiple fear words can be used in a single use of fear. For a second check, a
Spearman correlation between the hand–coding and auto–coding was calculated
to be .728. The dictionary of fear tracks strongly with a hand–coding of fear.
Fig. 1: Hand–coded use of fear vs. Auto–coded use of fear
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Independent Variables
Each press release was coded for the sub–issue addressed. Nine sub–issues were
identified, including 1) gun control measures including proliferation and assault
weapons ban, 2) ammunition control and bans, 3) background checks, 4) home
defense, including “Stand Your Ground” laws, 5) gun rights and gun deregula-
tion, 6) general gun culture and gun violence, 7) Operation Fast and Furious,
8) United Nations Arms Trade Treaty, 9) Other issues identified by the groups
as having implications for gun policy. Each press release was also coded for the
whether it came from a gun–control group or a gun–rights group. Finally, each
statement was coded for whether it was advocating a pro–status quo position or
a pro–change position. A release could fall into one of four meaningful categories:
pro–gun control/pro–change [N=93], pro–gun control/pro–status quo [N=23], pro–
gun rights/pro–change [N=64], pro–gun rights/pro–status quo [N=106]. Although
the overall stance or ideology of the group is fixed as either pro–gun control or
pro–gun rights, the group could take pro–change or pro–status quo positions. For
example, the Brady campaign could advocate for background checks in one press
release (pro–gun control/pro–change) and in another rail against efforts to pass
“Stand Your Ground” laws at the state level (pro–gun control/pro–status quo).
Two methods are used to test the hypothesis. First, a difference–in–means
test was conducted between the rates of fear of the four categories of statements.
Next, a negative binomial count model was estimated. The unit of observation for
the model is the press release [N=286]. The dependent variable is the automated
count of fear words. The independent variables include an indicator for whether
the press release was pro–status quo, an indicator for whether the press release
was issued by a gun–rights group, and a series of indicators for each of the nine
sub–issue areas. The first sub–issue was excluded so the model would estimate.
The indicator for pro–status quo is expected to be positive and statistically sig-
nificant and represents a direct test of the theory that fear is used by defenders of
the status quo to help them accomplish their policy goals. The expectation is that
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the coefficient on the gun–rights group indicator will be statistically insignificant,
as no differences between the two sides are expected.
An indicator for each of the sub–issues is included for two reasons. The first
is that there is a clustering of sub–issues in the data that needs to be controlled
for otherwise risking biased estimates. That is, not all the releases are addressing
the same issue, but rather they cluster into different sub–issues. Some sub–issues
may or may not be topics that inherently generate more fear rhetoric than oth-
ers. For example, discussion of the UN’s attempts at gun trafficking treaties may
be an easy topic for gun–rights advocates to drum up fear, more so than simple
background checks. The second reason is that future work will extend to multiple
issues. Including an indicator for each of the sub–issues will keep the structure
of the model consistent and may yield insights into whether we expect some issue
to come up much more fearful than others. I did not include an independent in-
dicator variable for each of the groups. Though this clustering is also potentially
problematic, most of the variance is captured by the indicator for pro-gun group.
That is, the variance captured in the dichotomy of the two sides accounts for most
of the clustering by group. The negative binomial was run with an individual
indicator for each group and the point estimate and standard error on the status
quo defender variable was the same out to the fourth decimal point. Also included
in the model is an offset for the total number of words. This is simply an “ex-
posure” variable for which no parameter is estimated; its purpose is instead to
control for the fact that there is likely to be more fear words in statements that
have more words all together. This technique effectively transforms the dependent
variable into a rate rather than a count. The results of the difference–in–means
and model estimation are discussed below. The total number of observations for
the independent indicator variables are included in the appendix.
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Results and Discussion: Defending the Status
Quo With Fear
To start, difference–in–means t–tests were conducted to see if there was a
statistically significant difference between the four meaningful categories of state-
ments. The results of theses t–tests can be found in Table 3. The rate of fear
is calculated by taking the total number of fear words across all statements in
the category and dividing by the total number of words across all statements in
the category. Categories that share symbols are statistically significantly differ-
ent from one another. Examining pro–gun control groups, there is a statistically
significantly higher use of fear in press releases that advocate for the status quo
than releases from the same groups when advocating change. A similar pattern
is found for gun–rights groups; gun–rights groups use fear at a lesser rate when
advocating for change than when they want to prevent change. Gun rights groups
were statistically significantly more likely to use fear than gun–control groups
when advocating change, but the relationship is not statistically significant when
defending the status quo. This is initial evidence that fear is a strategy used by
status quo defenders, evidenced by both the difference within sides depending on
the stance taken and the lack of difference in the use of fear between sides when
defending the status quo.
Table 3: Rate of Fear
Pro–Gun Control Pro–Gun Rights Total
Pro–Status Quo .011† .008 ? .009
Pro–Change .004† ‡ .005 ‡ ? .004
Total .006 .006 .006
† ‡ ? Each symbol represents a statistically significant difference
between the cells sharing the symbol at p< .05 level
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The negative binomial model also provides support for the fear hypothesis.
The coefficient estimate for the status quo defender variable is statistically signifi-
cant and in the expected direction. Being a status quo defender, as opposed to an
advocate of change, has a positive effect on the use of fear words, all else equal.
The ideology of the group was not a statistically significant predictor of the use
of fear. It did not matter if the group was a liberal pro–gun control group or a
conservative pro–gun rights group; rather, both used fear when defending cher-
ished policies and to much less of an extent when advocating for change. Turning
to the sub–issues, discussion of the Operation Fast and Furious scandal was the
only issue that was statistically significant at the p< .05 level. Debating it is more
likely to feature the use of fear than the excluded category (gun control, including
the assault weapons ban). Although many were significant at the p< .1, I did
not have any any directional hypothesis about the issues’ exhibition of fear and
therefore would not conclude that these issues are more or less fearful than the
excluded issue.
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Table 4: Negative Binomial Model Results
Estimate Std. Error Pr(> |z|)
Intercept -5.5824 0.1107 0.0000
SQ Defender 0.7001 0.1096 0.0000
Pro–gun Group -0.0565 0.1123 0.6147
Ammunition 0.1321 0.2531 0.6018
Background Checks 0.2646 0.1536 0.0851
Stand Your Ground 0.3020 0.1622 0.0626
Gun Rights/Deregulation 0.3634 0.2019 0.0719
Gun Culture/Violence -0.0345 0.1489 0.8166
Fast and Furious 0.5615 0.1885 0.0029
Arms Trade Treaty 0.3137 0.1815 0.0840
Other Issues 0.4028 0.2166 0.0630
N 286
φ 4.361
AIC 1197.392
BIC 1241.264
An expected use of fear words can be calculated from the model estimates.
This quantity of interest yields an estimate of how much fear, on average, can be
expected in political rhetoric given the ideological position and the position on
the particular issue of the statement. The expected use of fear words is featured
in Figure 2. With the other variables held at their minimum,9 being pro–status
quo yields an expected use of eight fear words per thousand words. Being pro–
change yields an expected use of fear of about 4 words per thousand, thus being
pro–status quo produces an expected use of fear that is two-fold higher than being
pro–change. Both pro–gun control and pro–gun rights also have an expected use
9 Since the independent variables are all indicator variables, holding them at their mean does
not make substantive sense. Instead all were held at their minimum.
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of fear around 4 words per thousand. The confidence intervals of pro–change,
pro–gun control, and pro–gun rights overlap one another, while pro–status quo is
statistically significantly different. Taking a pro–status quo position results in dou-
ble the use of fear in political rhetoric compared to being a proponent of change.
Therefore, I conclude that there is substantial support for my hypothesis, that
defenders of the status quo will use fear at a greater rate than advocates of change.
Fig. 2: Expected Use of Fear Words
Next Steps in the Study of the Politics of
Emotion
In 1933, during Franklin Roosevelt’s first inaugural address, the newly elected
president hypothesized about the role of emotions in public policy making, stating
24
“So, first of all, let me assert my firm belief that the only thing we have to fear
is fear itself—nameless, unreasoning, unjustified terror which paralyzes needed ef-
forts to convert retreat into advance.” Roosevelt states what is often observed by
politicians, pundits, and the public—emotions can be activated by the events in
the political world and used to accomplish policy goals. In other words, emotions
matter for public policy making. In particular, this study finds that fear is used
more often by defenders of the status quo than advocates of change, much like
Roosevelt hypothesized years ago.
Because of the different effects emotions have on political behavior, political
actors will strategically appeal to certain emotions depending on their stance on
an issue and regardless of their ideology. The study is limited in nature, both a
strength and a weakness. By focusing on fear, I was able to build a first–of–its–
kind sentiment dictionary tailored for political rhetoric. This process can then be
expanded to the other three emotions discussed in the theoretical framework for
a full, rigorous, and innovative test of the theory. Focusing on the gun control
debate in some ways limits the generalizability of the findings, but it proves a hard
test for the hypothesis as both advocates of change and defenders of the status
quo could capitalize on fears of mass killings, murder, and crime to forward their
agenda. Furthermore, by dividing the statements into nine different sub–issue
areas, I was able to investigate how the results may hold across many different
issue areas. Even when controlling for the different topics within gun–control,
being a defender of the status quo was estimated to have a positive effect on the
use of fear. Nevertheless, this paper should be expanded in four ways: 1)across
each of the discrete emotions theorized to be important for political behavior, 2)
across many issue areas, 3) across a greater span of time, 4) across many different
types of political rhetoric.
There is some evidence here that political actors not only appeal to emotions,
but do so in a systematic manner. The fact that fear is appealed to by defenders of
the status quo, whether they be a liberal or a conservative group, is evidence of a
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“master-frame” that could play out across multiple issues. While much attention
in the literature has been payed to how individual issues have been framed, and
the power of those frames in fueling policy outcomes, less work has been done
on a master framing strategy. In other words, there may be a larger strategy to
defending the status quo or advocating for change that involves strong cognitive
frames and appeals to particular emotions. In particular, the power of fear could
be one of the reasons it is so difficult to enact change. While research on emotions
is beginning to flourish in the mass political behavior subfield of political science,
there are many applications to elite level politics, institutions, and policy making
that could also yield fruitful insights.
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APPENDIX
Total Number of Observations for Independent Variables
Variable N
Pro–Status Quo 129
Pro–Change 157
Pro–Gun Rights Statements 170
Pro–Gun Control Statements 116
Assault Weapons and Proliferation Sub–issue 101
Ammunition Sub–issue 10
Background Checks Sub–issue 28
Stand Your Ground Sub–issue 31
Gun Rights/Deregulation Sub–issue 17
Gun Culture/Violence Sub–issue 44
Fast and Furious Sub–issue 24
Arms Trade Treaty Sub–issue 19
Other Issues Sub-issue 12
Number of Statements by Group Type and Issue Position
Pro–Gun Control Anti–Gun Control
Pro–Status Quo 23 106
Anti–Status Quo 93 64
Total 116 170
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Number of Statements by Group
Group No. of Statements
Brady 54
CSGV 10
Mayors 23
VPC 29
GOA 64
NRA 75
CCRKBA 41
Total 286
Qualitative Coding Scheme
Slippery Slope Claiming that the policy is a step in the
direction to a much more unseemly policy.
Also known as Trojan horse arguments.
Ulterior Motives Painting the opposing side as acting for a rea-
son other than the one that they have stated.
Unknown Conse-
quences
Highlighting the unknown nature of the op-
posing side’s policy, especially the “what-ifs”
and “coulds” about the policy and its conse-
quences.
Uncontrollable Situa-
tion
Demonstrating the presence of threat by
highlighting the inability to control the ef-
forts or consequences of the opposing side or
issue.
Hyperbolic Threat Using overly deterministic language or exag-
geration about the opposing side or issue.
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The Dictionary of Fear Words
Threat Uncertainty
extort* abridge insidious alarm*
extrem* agenda obliterat* anxi*
fundamental* attempt obsess* bidding
grave backdoor pressure cautio*
gut breakneck push could
unnecessary code radical* distrust
unrelenting coerc* ram doubt*
unremitting cram* reckless* false
violate* danger* relentless gamble
weaken deliberat* scar* hidden
destroy* scheme maybe
destruct* seige might
disaster slip* motive*
disembowel slope question
draconian sneak* risk*
egregious step secrecy
endanger strip* secret
erase tantamount secrets
erode threat* so–called
eviscerat* toward* ulterior
exploit* trample* unable
extinct* transform* uncertain
No. of Times in Data 593 321
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